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Paper given to the National Defence University, Washington Nov 2006.
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Procurement
In the light of the European Defence Integration report by the esteemed Centre for Strategic and International Studies it would seem timely for the European Parliament Independence and Democracy group to make some observations and share some of its concerns with those involved in the project.
Most of the paper would seem to make excellent sense. Europe for too long has relied too heavily on the USA for its military protection. It is both right and proper that Europe should shoulder more of its own responsibilities. The CSIS paper is strong on practical solutions and strategic military assessment. Indeed one would expect it to be so with the level of expertise available to it.
However the military premise is that there is a common goal. That the enormous good will that soldiers, sailors and airmen from North America and Europe have built working together through NATO since the war is somehow shared by the political elite.
This is not our view, although this can be further masked by the natural good will that NATO foreign ministers have often endorsed by personal friendships.
The “Cluster of countries” concept in the paper is particularly sensible and attractive. Yet if defence is about anything it is about resources – money – the Tax Dollar if you will.
The Europeans are particularly parsimonious when it comes to defence budgets. We therefore regard such use of defence budgets as a fair guide to political intention.
What are these concerns? We believe there is now a gradual but determined move away from NATO by Europe which is inexorably sucking in the United Kingdom away from its traditional role of bridge-master between the United States and Europe. The first step on this path was the British agreement at St Malo in 1998 that the UK’s armed forces should be integrated with those of the EU. Part of an autonomous EU defence project capable of operating independently of NATO. We feel a procurement audit is the safest way to uncover the truth, rather than an unsubjective search for political rhetoric. However, we will pass on some political rhetoric so procurement policy is not shown in a vacuum. As we know war is simply another projection of political policy.
No matter how disappointing it may be to an ex British cavalryman turned logistician future warfare is about high technology.
But wars are won when you have the modern equivalent of the Gatling gun against spears. I wonder how many of you know this week is the anniversary of Richard Gatling’s patent of that fearsome weapon in 1862? One of the great keys to future warfare is the US GPS/Navstar system. A NATO asset. Yet the key to the EU’s independent defence system is the Galileo system. Due to enter service in 2008 most aspects of EU defence depend on future European weapons development. Europe should be making greater resources available within the NATO structure albeit with less emphasis on the need for US assets and personnel in particular. The British Army traditionally kept a non-European theatre rapid deployment force. A detachment if you will. We would advocate a European Division of NATO for role specific operations.
Help us here with some answers if you can.
Joint US-British bids to supply 2 billion dollar’s worth of trucks were in 2004 rejected in favour of trucks built by the German firm Man-Nutzfahrzeuge, adding the name of a former British firm ERF to imply some British contribution. US and other non-EU reconnaissance vehicles were rejected in favour of an obsolescent and much more expensive version made by the Italian firm Iveco, although their origin is again to be disguised behind the name of the British firm BAE Land Systems.
A joint project with the US to develop a 155mm howitzer has been abandoned in favour of a French gun firing German-designed shells. Battlefield radar systems are being built in Germany and Sweden. Development of unmanned aircraft is being led by France, while the RAF’s main strike aircraft will be the Eurofighter, firing French-made missiles.
So the list continues, for projects large and small. Two new British aircraft carriers are to be built for the Royal Navy with the French firm Thales playing a central part in their design and construction. The UK has even abandoned its capacity to manufacture small arms, so that the British army’s future rifles are likely to be supplied by Belgium. Yet Belgium refused us artillery shells when we were fighting to rescue British sovereign territory from a fascist dictatorship in the Argentine.
The one consistent pattern in recent MoD procurement policy has been that, wherever possible, US firms are now being excluded, even where this means excluding British firms associated with them, and often buying inferior or more costly equipment than that which Anglo-US contractors could supply.
Let me give you some examples:
The European White Paper on space states “to be credible and effective” the system must be based on autonomous access to reliable global information. “Space technologies ensure access to knowledge, information and military capabilities on the ground that can only be available through the capacity to launch develop and operate satellites providing global communications, positioning and observation systems”.
The French have confirmed Galileo will be available for French military use. This you have known her for nearly a year.
The obvious intention is for the European Rapid Reaction Force to be Galileo enabled. None of this in itself is in anyway wrong. However as laymen, albeit perhaps educated laymen we would ask what happens to forces working with Navstar? Particularly for the UK which relies on the Bowman digital communications system. Will Bowman have to be dual equipped? Or will a choice have to be made between systems? Again as you will know the Dutch marines recently decided on Bowman because of their historic relationship with the UK and USA forces. Galileo or Navstar? Or both? We are not experts here but as an ex soldier I would have thought both was a tall order.
What about Trucks? Or lorries as we called them in 1967 when I joined up! The UK has decided to buy German Trucks. The contract is worth two billion dollars, 5000 cargo plus recovery vehicles.
Yet MAN was bidding against amongst others Stewart and Stephenson, your existing suppliers. Again as you know Stewart and Stephenson has strong associations with LDV, multi drive and Lex Defence. This would have given the contract a high British built component. Your other competitor Oshkosh has a British subsidiary in Wales and is an existing supplier to the British Army. What was the rationale behind this decision? Could it be that MAN has a fleet management system called “Telemakes”?
This could be integrated into a net control logistical concept. Any future system of this sort would be Galileo lead.
What about light reconnaissance vehicles. My old Regiment, The City of London Yeomanry specialised in this role.
The US/UK joint venture originated in 1996 seeking an advanced solution to battlefield reconnaissance. We had Scimitar and Sabre, pretty uncomfortable and outdated things they were. Your own Humvee, Bradley and Stryker I think you will agree are no better.
Our joint venture was cancelled by your Congress and the project became much more ambitious. Too rich it would seem for the British Army’s blood.
Yet we had put in $250 million to the Future Scout and Cavalry System. The target date was 2007.
Yet the final award was to buy an Italian vehicle called Panther. 401 vehicles at about $300 million, 750,000 dollars each. Yet we could have bought your recce equivalent the M1114 up armoured Humvee for $170,000 each. Yet you were not asked to bid. I do not intend here to go into the whys and wherefores of what you might call the technology gap. I also know that in the Gulf, British units have a tendency to do things the old fashioned way. But this clearly was not a cost driven exercise. So why did we do it?
Another project question is the Mobile Artillery Monitoring Battlefield Radar and Counter Battery Radar. The collaborative programme between Germany, France and the UK is being built by Euro-Art in Munich. The MoD aims to acquire 10 sets at a cost estimated by our National Audit Office at 35 million dollars each. Yet our fellow Commonwealth partner India bought Raytheon Firefinder systems at 17 million dollars each.
The British MoD has also announced the new Tanker Aircraft will be European Airbus A330-200 in preference to UK’s BAE Systems and Boeing. The Eurofighter armed with Meteor (French) not yet proven. Raytheon at literally half the price was rejected.
Why have we abandoned NATO standard ammunition when developing the “Objective Future Cannon Programme”. Anyone with military experience of my age knows how hard and long we laboured for that standard.
Why did the British MoD only buy Javelin to replace Milan as a light anti-tank gun after the failure of the European “Trigat” system losing $200,000 million in the process? Another $600,000 million were lost when the “Trigat” system collapsed and we ended up buying Longbow/Hellfire US system anyway.
Let me move on to the navy. My Royal Naval colleagues are anticipating the new Type 45 Destroyer with enthusiasm. I had the pleasure of being aboard HMS Liverpool only a few months ago on patrol. It was clear even to a layman that a new ship is overdue. Yet we have only confirmed orders for six ships. There is not time here to cover the whole story but again incompetent procurement in the shape of an ill conceived bias to European designed weapon systems has lead to an overspend of $5 billion. Had we bought the Arleigh Burke class multi platform US ship off the shelf at 1200 million dollars we could have saved the British taxpayer 5 billion dollars (plus a proven better all round capability.) Yet the Royal Navy flagship Illustrious was tied up for 4 months because the budget had run out for fuel. This is small change in comparison.
Let me make it clear I do not criticise service personnel here, it is the hidden hand of politics. Or perhaps monumental incompetence the bugbear of public spending procurement the world over.
Let us look for a moment at the concept of military doctrine. In December 2004, the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations published a report entitled: “Audit of European Strategy”.
“In order to increase the harmonisation of doctrine among EU members, a doctrine centre is necessary. A European Defence College could bring together military and civilian personnel from all EU countries in order to promote a common strategic culture that incorporates new doctrines and concepts. A common culture is also an indispensable component of a common strategy for Europe. Since European operations do exist, a common doctrine should underpin them.
In fact, this had already been decided by the WEU Assembly sitting on 3 December 2003. It unanimously adopted a recommendation that the EU should:
Engage in an active policy of exchanges between European military schools, and establish a European defence college with a multinational, joint services intake with the aim of promoting higher training for officers and developing a common approach to civil and military response to operations conducted in the ESDP framework.
This is indeed advocated in the CSIS paper but with a NATO liaison element which the paper admits ‘has stalled’.
Then on 13 June 2005, the General Affairs Council (made public only by the Danish parliament) reported that “EU training in the field of ESDP” was already under way, with courses organised for 2005 to 2007. The pilot “high level” ESDP course ended in March, and an orientation course on the ESDP had also been organised. On that basis, said the report, “the arrangements for the functioning of the European Security and defence College have been defined. The necessary conditions to establish the College have been fulfilled.”
If Europe is developing different military doctrines, it already has a different political agenda. The perception of China as a geo-political threat is quite different from the United States. Yet there was no mention of China in the CSIS report. Surely the fundamental reason for reluctance to share cutting edge technology with the EU. NATO is it would seem being left to wither on the vine. Certainly politicians make nice warm statements to keep a sleeping public unaware of what is actually happening. But the political perspective in old Europe is broadly anti-American. National governments are nearly all socialist or neo-socialist. There is even a permanent socialist or neo socialist majority in the European Parliament, although that does not matter very much because it is not a law or policy making body like real parliaments in the industrialised democratic world.
Summary
Yet, as I said at the beginning, we are but lay folk. Perhaps we are wrong. But the United Kingdom drifted into what was called the Common Market thirty years ago. The British people were never told about political union. None of the things of which I have spoken have had any serious debate in the British Parliament or media. All EU decisions are taken behind closed doors. 95% of them go unchallenged by the European Parliament and undebated in the National Parliaments. All senior public service broadcasting personnel are paid for and selected by the government of the day.
The British Prime Minister approaches the end of his term of office. As Churchill told General De Gaulle in post war France, the “British people if pressed to choose between the continent or the open sea, they will always choose the open sea”. This is true today but the British people are not being asked. |
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